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KEEPING PROMISES: AN EXAMINATION OF CHARTER
SCHOOLS' VULNERABILITY TO CLAIMS FOR
EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY
Julie F. Mead· and Preston C. Green,

Ill*

Legal commentators have regularly argued that public elementary and secondary schools should be subject to educational liability for failing to educate, and for failing to identify
1
learning disabilities of individual students. However, since the
California Supreme Court's rejection of educational liability in
2
Peter W. v. San Francisco School District, the judiciary has
uniformly refused to hold school districts liable for the failure
to meet the educational needs of students. Courts have consistently rejected educational liability claims based on both tort
3
and statutory theories. Some suggest that arguments based on
4
constitutional theories would fare no better.
* Assistant Professor, Department of Educational Administration, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994.
** Department of Educational Policy, Research, and Administration, School of
Education, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
1. See e.g., John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A
Representational Focus, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 349 (1992); Catherine D. McBride, Educational Malpractice: Judicial Recognition Of A Limited Duty Of Educators Toward Individual Students; A State Law Cause Of Action For Educational Negligence, 1990 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 4 75 (1990); Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigat·
ing Educational Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1768 (1995); Cheryl L. Wade,
Educators Who Drive With No Hands: The Application of Analytical Concepts of Corpo·
rate Law in Certain Cases of Educational Malpractice, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437
(1995).
2. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
3. See e.g., Bell v. Board ofEduc. of West Haven, 739 A.2d 321 (Conn. App. Ct.
1999); Brantley v. District of Columbia, 640 A.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Doe v.
Town of Framingham, 965 F. Supp. 226 (D. Mass. 1997); Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. State Borough
Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981); Helm v. Professional Children's Sch., 431
N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). Hunter v. Board ofEduc., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982);
Hoffman v. Board ofEduc., 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.
Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div.
1982); Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854; Sellers v. School Bd. of Manassas, Virginia, 960
F.Supp. 1006 (E.D.Va. 1997).
4. McJessy, supra note 1.
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Charter schools, however, might be susceptible to educational liability claims because the rationales used by courts to
reject liability in the cases of conventional public elementary
and secondary institutions arguably do not apply to them. For
instance, charter schools might be vulnerable to causes of action based on contract. law because the charter school-parent
relationship is more contractual in nature than the relation5
ship between conventional schools and parents. In addition,
charter schools might be susceptible to statutory liability because the charter school legislation makes it perfectly clear
that the charter schools have a mandatory duty to meet the
goals established in the statutes.
This article examines whether charter schools might be
vulnerable to educational liability claims based on contractual
and statutory liability. The first section provides a review of
judicial opinions regarding educational liability claims based
on tort, statutory, and contract constitutional theories. This
section also examines the arguments put forward by legal
commentators regarding educational liability in traditional
school settings. The second section describes the particulars of
charter schools and the statutes and contracts that bind them.
Particular attention is paid to the range and types of commitments these schools make to their students and their parents
and the differences between charter and traditional public
schools. The third section analyzes why an educational liability
claim against a charter school based on contract law and/or
statutory terms might be successful.

I.

THEORIES OF ESTABLISHING THE EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY
OF CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Educational liability claims have been filed or suggested
under four general theories: tort theory, statutory theory, constitutional theory, and contract theory. As the discussion below
will illustrate, the first three have been applied and rejected in
traditional public school settings by numerous courts. The final

5. Jennifer T. Wall, The Establishment of Charter Schools: A Guide to Legal Issues for Legislatures, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 69 (1998). Wall expands on McJessy's
argument, supra note 1, that contract law should be the proper framework for analyzing educational liability claims, by noting that charter schools might also be susceptible
to such claims. This article expands upon the framework developed by Wall and
McJessy in Section III.
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category, contract theory, has met with limited success but only
in the private school or university setting.

A

Tort Theory

Most educational liability challenges have been based on
tort theory. There are two types of tort challenges: negligence
and misrepresentation. Educational liability claims based on
negligence require the plaintiffs to prove duty, breach of duty,
6
causation, and injury. The courts have uniformly rejected educational liability claims based on negligence. Several courts
have cited the difficulty of establishing a standard of care on
the part of the schools. In Peter W., for example, the California
Court of Appeals refused to recognize a cause of action sounding in negligence, in part, because "classroom methodology af7
fords no readily acceptable standards of care." Establishing
causation is another problem. As the Peter W. court explained,
physical, emotional, and environmental factors outside the control of the schools might affect a student's academic achievement.8 Moreover, several courts have questioned whether students alleging educational liability suffer from injuries for
9
which monetary damages can be awarded. The appropriate
remedy for educational injury is remedial training, not mone10
tary damages. Additionally, defenses to negligence claims,
such as contributory negligence, may bar students from obtain. a reme dy. 11
mg
Courts have also cited several public policy reasons for rejecting educational liability claims based on negligence. First,
the recognition of such claims would force the judiciary to re12
view the day-to-day decision-making of public schools. Second,
courts do not wish to subject schools to extra financial burdens.13 Third, the recognition of negligence claims could result

6. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 30
(5th ed. 1984).
7. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
8. Id. at 861.
9. Hunter, 439 A.2d at 585.
10. Thomas G. Eschweiler, Educational Malpractice in Sex Education, 49 SMU L.
REV. 101 (1995).
11. McJessy, supra note 1.
12. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
13. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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14

in a flood of litigation. Fourth, courts have claimed that the
proper avenue for dispute resolution is through administrative
agencies that have been established by the educational institu15
.
t lOllS.

Plaintiffs have also raised educational liability challenges
based on a misrepresentation theory. There are two types of
misrepresentation claims: negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation. An action for negligent misrepresentation arises when the defendant, owing a duty of care to
the plaintiff, makes a false statement, the defendant intends
for the plaintiff to rely on the false statement, and as a result of
16
the reliance, the plaintiff suffers injury. An action for intentional misrepresentation arises when the defendant intends to
make a false statement to a particular person with the intent
that it convey a certain meaning and that it be believed and
17
acted upon by the person to whom it is made. The judiciary
has generally rejected negligent misrepresentation actions for
the same public policy reasons as reiecting educational mal1
practice claims based on negligence. Establishing an intentional misrepresentation cause of action is difficult because: (1)
an honest belief by an educator that a representation is accurate negates the claim; and (2) even if the intent-to-deceive
element is shown, the plaintiff must still prove the student relied on the representation and the reliance was justifiable un19
der the circumstances.
B.

Statutory Theory

The failure of educational liability claims based on negligence and misrepresentation has forced plaintiffs to develop
other theories for educational liability claims. One theory is
based on state educational statutes: plaintiffs argue that state
statutory schemes have established a standard of care, and
that the school district has failed to comply with this standard.
However, the courts have generally refused to recognize educational liability claims based on the state's statutory duty. In Pe-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354.
Brantley, 640 A.2d at 184.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 6, at 107.
ld.
Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
Eschweiler, supra note 10.
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ter W., for example, the California Court of Appeals found that
state statutes did not create a "mandatory duty" for school districts to protect against injury, but were rather conceived "as
provisions directed to the attainment of optimum educational
20
results." In D.S. W. v. Fairbanks North State Borough School
21
District, the Supreme Court of Alaska refused to find that its
special education statute imposed liability on a school district
because the state legislature did not intend statutes to provide
22
parents with remedies for damages. Moreover, the courts
have held that the same public policy reasons that apply to rejecting educational malpractice claims based on negligence also
23
apply to such charges based on statutes.
24
However, in B.M v. State, the Montana Supreme Court
held that a duty of care existed for a child in the testing and
placement in a special educational program. The court found
that the sources of duty were the state's constitutional provision of education for all citizens, the mandatory attendance
statute to implement the constitutional guarantee, and administrative statutes that outline procedures to be followed by individual school districts in administering special education
programs. Still, B.M. seems to be a singular exception in the
litany of educational malpractice cases based on statutory theory.
Yet, none of these cases were litigated during the current
educational policy context that focuses so heavily on accountability. Speaking of traditional public schools, Paul Weckstein
argues that public policy may have actually shifted to "counte25
nanc[e]" educational liability on statutory grounds. He reasons that the proliferation of state statutes specifying professional standards for teachers, performance standards for
students and an increasing emphasis on high-stakes testing
may now sufficiently delineate a duty and define causation. Of
the public policy arguments, he writes:
Policy arguments about the danger of putting public fiscal re-

20. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
21. 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981).
22. !d. at 556.
23. !d.
24. 200 Mont. 58, 649 P.2d 425 (1981).
25. "School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality Education" in Law and
School Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity, Jay P. Heubert, editor
(1999). Yale University Press, pp. 306-389 at 356.
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sources in jeopardy also seem less convincing, particularly in
instances of long-term breach of educational duties resulting
in injuries to children that cannot otherwise be fully compensated. The public has strong interests in assuring highquality education, avoiding these harms, and ensuring that
its resources are not wasted on failing programs and practices.26

C.

Constitutional Theory

Commentators have suggested that state and federal constitutions provide a duty to educate, the violation of which
could lead to an educational liability claim. In San Antonio
27
School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court effectively
invalidated the United States Constitution as a vehicle for asserting an educational malpractice claim. In Rodriguez, the
Supreme Court found that funding disparities created by property taxes were constitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that education was not a fundamental
28
right under the Constitution. This negation effectively precludes a plaintiff from claiming that the Constitution provides
29
a mandatory duty to educate.
Plaintiffs would also have a difficult time asserting that
state constitutional provisions provide parents of students with
an enforceable duty to educate. First, state constitutional provisions are so broadly drafted that courts may interpret them
as expressing a general goal of public policy, rather than as
30
conferring specifically enforceable rights. Second, courts may
find that constitutional provisions are unenforceable mandates
31
that must be implemented through statutory provisions.
D.

Contract Theory

Kevin McJessy argues forcefully that children attending
public schools should be able to base their educational liability

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

I d. at 357.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 29-39.
Culhane, supra note 1.
McJessy, supra note 1.
31. !d.

CHARTER SCHOOL LIABILITY

35]

32

41

claims on contract law. A contract is defined as "a promise, or
a set of promises, that the law will enforce or at least recognize
33
in some way." McJessy describes three theories of educational
liability under contract law: (1) implied or express contract, (2)
34
third-party beneficiary, and (3) promissory estoppel.
To establish the breach of an implied or express contract, a
plaintiff must establish six elements: (1) mutual assent, (2)
consideration, (3) two or more contracting parties, (4) sufficiently definite to determine a breach, (5) legal capacity to enter into a contract, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding the
35
formation of a contract. In the public school context, the
plaintiff might assert that the school promised to provide a
minimal level of education either implicitly, through the goals
inherent in the educational process or expressly, through
36
statutory or constitutional provisions. In return, the plaintiff
alleges that he promised not to seek private education as consideration.37 In the alternative, the plaintiff may assert that
38
school attendance constitutes sufficient consideration.
In the conventional public school context, the implied contractual approach suffers from two major weaknesses. First, a
plaintiff would have difficulty establishing offer and acceptance
because mandatory laws requiring students to attend school
39
make it difficult to establish mutual assent. Second, a plaintiff might not be able to establish the existence of considera40
tion, or "bargained-for exchange." Because states provide public education free of cost to each individual student, a student
41
cannot allege attendance as consideration.
Under the second approach, the plaintiff would claim that
the school district and the teachers enter into a contract with
42
the students as third party beneficiaries. A plaintiff would assert that the teacher-school board agreement serves as the con-

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

McJessy, supra note 1.
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS§ 1.1 (1982).
McJessy, supra note 1.

ld.
Id.
Id.
ld.
ld.
Id.
ld.
ld.
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tract on which educational liability could be established. In
addition, policies and regulations promulgated by the school
44
board could serve as implied terms in the teachers' contract. A
plaintiff would further assert that the agreement would require
the school either to place students in the proper educational
program or to refrain from promoting students who fail to meet
45
the legally imposed requirements.
There are two major obstacles that must be overcome in order for a court to recognize an educational malpractice claim on
the part of a third-party beneficiary. The first obstacle is the
general reluctance of the courts to accord third parties benefits
46
in connection with governmental contracts. However, courts
are more likely to recognize third-party beneficiary claims if:
(1) consequential damages are not involved, so that the promi47
sor's risk is more limited; (2) the contract is one to perform a
48
duty that the government owes to members of the public; or
(3) the duty assumed by the promisor has been narrowed from
a general duty to the public to a specific duty to a small group
49
of individuals. A plaintiff would also have to convince a court
not to reject a third-party beneficiary claim due to the public
policy reasons used to reject educational liability claims under
other legal theories. 5°
The third approach, promissory estoppel, has an advantage
over the other two approaches because the absence of contrac51
tual elements does not foreclose recovery. Promissory estoppel
is defined as:

43. McJessy, supra note 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, at§ 10.4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Torres u. Little Flower Children's Services, 64 N.Y.2d 119, 474 N.E.2d 223
(1984), stands for this proposition. In Torres, a functionally illiterate former student
sued a childcare agency that had entered into a contractual agreement with a city governmental agency to educate him. The Court of Appeals of New York rejected the student's contractual claim because it "could not overcome the policy objections to the
courts' involvement in these matters." 474 N.E.2d at 227. The dissent countered:
"[T]here is ample proof, when measured against the obligations of the municipal defendants under statute and regulation, and of defendant Little Flower, under statute,
regulation and contract of which plaintiff was the third-party beneficiary, to require
denial of defendants' motions." I d. at 228.
51. McJessy, supra note 1.
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A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
52
breach may be limited as justice requires.

A parent might have more success with a promissory estoppel claim than the other contractual approaches because the
parent merely has to show that she relied on the promises
made by the school or school district, and that the school or
school district had reason to expect reliance, instead of having
53
to establish consideration. Additionally, the parents would
not have to establish that they were intended beneficiaries, as
54
is the case with third-party beneficiary claims. However, the
parents might find establishing reliance in the context of a
conventional public school difficult: because attendance to the
conventional public school is based on school zoning regulations, schools may not have any incentive to make any statements that would induce reliance on the part of the parent to
choose a particular school.
In other educational contexts, such as student-university
relationships and student-private school relationships, courts
have been more willing to find that an implied or express contract exists, thus entitling students to damages awards. In the
student-university relationship, the first element for proving
the existence of an implied or express contract is mutual assent. This is established when the university extends an offer
55
of admission that is accepted by the applicant. As consideration, the student foregoes offers from other universities. The
difficulty arises in determining the terms of the agreement that
are sufficiently certain for establishing a contractual relation6
ship. Ross v. Creighton Universit/ provides guidance in making this determination. In Ross, the Seventh Circuit examined
the claim brought by a Creighton University student (Ross)
who was on scholarship to play on the men's basketball team.
Realizing that Ross' academic preparation was far below that of
the average Creighton student, the university induced him to
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§

McJessy, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).

91(1) (1981).

44
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attend by assuring Ross that he "would receive a meaningful
57
education while at Creighton." However, after four years at
the university, Ross had the language skills of a fourth grader
8
and the reading skills of a seventh-grader. 5 Ross sued the university alleging liability under tort law, and breach of contract.
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the educational liability claim
59
based on negligence, but found that a viable breach of con60
tract claim had been made. In reaching its decision, the court
found that Ross had identified specific promises that could
serve as a sufficient foundation upon which to bring a breach of
. 61
con t ract cl mm.
In a more recent hi~her education case, Gupta u. New Britain General Hospital, the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
while rejecting the student's claim, explained that there are "at
least two situations wherein courts will entertain a cause of action for institutional breach of contract for educational services."63 The first would involve "a showing that the educational program failed in some fundamental respect" and the
second would "arise if the educational institution failed to fulfill a specific contractual promise distinct from any overall obli64
gation to offer a reasonable program."
An implied or express contract also exists between students
and private elementary and secondary schools. The first element, mutual assent, is established when the private school extends an offer to educate the student for a fee, which is ac65
cepted.
As consideration, the student foregoes other

57. !d. at 411.
58. /d. at 412.
59. !d. at 414-15.
60. !d. at 416-17.
61. !d. at 417.
62. 687 A.2d I l l (Conn. 1996).
63. /d. at 120.
64. !d. In fact, a recent case was brought by parents of children in a New Haven
elementary school alleging that their traditional public school had failed the children
under the first Gupta exception. The school had instituted a teaching methodology
called the "responsive classroom method" that the parents claimed was responsible for
the deterioration of student discipline and the creation of an unsafe learning environment. It was the only school in the district employing the methodology. The court rejected the claim since the complaint "sounds in tort, not breach of contract." However,
the court reiterated the two "Gupta exceptions" as proper theories for bringing educational liability claims. Bell, 739 A.2d 321.
65. McJessy, supra note 1.
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66

educational opportunities, including public schooling. Squires
67
v. Sierra Nevada Educational Foundation, Inc. demonstrates
that this contractual relationship might also expose private,
elementary and secondary schools to breach of contract claims.
In Squires, the parents chose to send their son Brandon to
Cambridge School because they suspected that he might have
68
difficulties learning to read. The principal advised the Squires
that Cambridge "had the capabilities and the facilities to diagnose and remediate any reading difficulties which might develop,"69 and employed a "highly qualified" stafr_1° The Squires
enrolled Brandon in Cambridge, and for four years (prekindergarten through second grade) he received positive pro71
gress reports. However, in the fourth quarter of the second
grade, the school reported that Brandon's reading ability was
significantly below grade level, and that he needed to repeat
72
the second grade. The Squires sued Cambridge for breach of
contract, alleging that Brandon was taught by inexperienced
73
interns, rather than highly qualified staff. Additionally, the
Squires obtained an affidavit from a reading expert that Brandon's reading deficiencies "were more likely than not the result
of inappropriate instruction and intervention during Brandon's
74
four years at Cambridge School." The court concluded that the
contract between the parent and the school "sufficiently par75
ticularized services to support a claim for breach of contract."

II.

DESCRIPTION OF CHARTER SCHOOLS

There is no doubt that charter schools have altered the educational landscape since the various cases described above were
litigated. Charter schools, although public schools, differ from
traditional public schools in that they must commit themselves
to educational outcomes by means of a charter contract. In ad-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.
75.

!d.
107 Nev. 902, 823 P.2d 256 (1991).

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 257.
!d.
!d.
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dition, these schools have no natural student population from
which to draw. Rather, they must entice parents to enroll their
76
children. Parents then use the equivalent of a "voucher" from
77
the state to pay for the child's education.
As of this writing, thirty-five states plus the District of Co78
lumbia and Puerto Rico make provision for charter schools.
These special public schools are constituted by means of a charter contract between a designated chartering authority and
those who wish to operate a school. The particulars regarding
how and under what circumstances a charter school may beestablished vary from state to state. For example, some states al79
low only school districts to charter schools. Others require RR80
plicants to seek approval from the state educational agency.
81
Still others extend chartering authority to universities. Finally, the State of Wisconsin has granted chartering authority
82
to the City of Milwaukee. Charter school statutes also vary
according to the number that may be established in a given
83
time frame, whether private schools may convert to public
84
charter school status, and the length of time a charter may be
85
granted.
However, even with this variability, charter schools have
several characteristics in common. First of all, charters are
granted in a quid pro quo attempt to reform education. States

76. Some state statutes explicitly state that no child can be compelled to attend a
charter school. See e.g., WIS. STAT. §118.40(6).
77. These "voucher" amounts are calculated based upon the state's per/pupil aid
formula.
78. Those states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See the
US Charter Schools home page for information on the charter school movement in the
United States. See U.S. Charter Schools (Jan. 17, 2001)
<http://www. uscharterschools.orgl>.
79. For example: California, Colorado.
80. For example: Massachusetts, North Carolina.
81. For example: Michigan, Wisconsin.
82. See Wrs STAT. 118.40(2r).
83. For example: Alaska limits the number of charter schools to 30 statewide
(ALASKA STAT. §14.03.250 (Michie 1995)) .
84. For example: Wisconsin, Arizona, Michigan allow conversion, while New York
does not.
85. Most charters are granted from 3-5 years. Arizona grants the longest charters, which may be given for a period of 15 years.
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relieve charter schools of certain state laws and regulations in
exchange for the charter school's commitment by means of a
contract to specific outcomes. Charter schools may not charge
tuition, but utilize per pupil state aid dollars to fund their efforts. Schools must outline their mission and curricular focus
and undergo some sort of review process to determine whether
they have sufficiently mapped out their program to qualify for
charter school status. Once those proposing a school have adequately justified their educational plan to the chartering entity,86 they must enter into a contract to deliver those services
to the children who will elect to attend.
Charter school statutes dictate the required content of charter school applications and contracts. Table 1 quotes statutord;'
language related to student outcomes from five state statutes.
As noted, while charter statutes may free charter schools from
some of the rules and regulations binding traditional public
schools, they are held bound to the academic standards established by that state. Most states also require charter schools to
participate in any statewide achievement or proficiency testing.
In addition, as the language below illustrates, charter schools
must carefully delineate their educational plans and must specify precise educational goals for their students and the means
by which progress toward those goals will be established.

86. State Educational Agency, school district, university, or other entity designated with chartering authority by statute.
87. These five states were selected as exemplars: Minnesota has the oldest charter school statute (1991); Arizona and California have chartered the most schools;
Michigan was the first, and at this time, only, state to grant chartering authority to
universities; Wisconsin was the first to grant chartering authority to a municipality.
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Table 1: Examples of statutory language related to Student
Outcomes

Arizona

California

4. That it designs a method to measure pupil
progress, toward the pupil outcomes adopted by the
state board of education pursuant to section 15741.01 including participation m the Arizona
instrument to measure standards test and the
nationally
standardized
norm-referenced
achievement test as designated by the state board
and the completion and distribution of an annual
report card as prescribed in chapter 7, article 3 of this
title.
(A) A description of the educational program of the
school, designed, among other things, to identify
those whom the school is attempting to educate, what
it means to be an "educated person" in the 21st
century, and how learning best occurs. The goals
identified in that program shall include the objective
of enabling pupils to become self-motivated,
competent, and lifelong learners.
(B) The measurable pupil outcomes identified for use
by the charter school. "Pupil outcomes," for purposes
of this part, means the extent to which all pupils of
the school demonstrate that they have attained the
skills, knowledge, and attitudes specified as goals in
the school's educational program.
(C) The method by which pupil progress in meeting
those pupil outcomes is to be measured.

35]
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Minnesota
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(ii) A copy of the educational goals of the public school
academy and the curriculum to be offered and
methods of pupil assessment to be used by the public
school academy. To the extent applicable, the
progress of the pupils in the public school academy
shall be assessed using at least a Michigan education
assessment program (MEAP) test or an assessment
instrument developed under section 104a of the state
school aid act of 1979, being section 388.1704a of the
Michigan Compiled Laws, for a state-endorsed high
school diploma, or 1 or more of the following
nationally normed tests: the California achievement
test, the Stanford achievement test, or the
Iowa test of basic skills.
2) specific outcomes pupils are to achieve under
subdivision 10;

Subd. 10. Pupil performance. A charter school must
design its programs to at least meet the outcomes
adopted by the state board for public school students.
In the absence of state board requirements, the school
must meet the outcomes contained in the contract
with the sponsor. The achievement levels of the
outcomes contained in the contract may exceed the
achievement levels of any outcomes adopted by the
state board for public school students.
Wisconsin

3. A description of the educational program of the
school.
4. The methods the school will use to enable pupils to
attain the educational goals under s. 118.01.
5. The method by which pupil progress in attaining
the educational goals under s. 118.01 will be
measured. 88

Michigan provides an interesting example of precisely defining students' educational success. For example, a guide for
those seeking charter school status from Central Michigan

88. WIS. STAT. § 118.40 (2)(d) requires that "the chartering or contracting entity ... shall ... Administer the examinations under ss. 118.30 (1m) and 121.02 (1) (r)
to pupils enrolled in charter schools under this sub-section."

50
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University requires that applications describe:
•

Specific performance indicators

•

Use the MEAP (Michigan Educational Assessment
Program)/HSPT (High School Proficiency Test)

•

Use a nationally norm-referenced achievement test

•

State specific timelines for success

•

State who must accomplish the goal, what is to be
accomplished, how success is to be measured and
89
when it is to be accomplished.

This guide also provides samples of academic goals. For instance:
•

Academic achievement will increase for all students
in the areas of math, science, reading and social
studies. This will be measured by 70% of all1"t grade
students scoring at or above grade level on the total
battery score of the Metropolitan Achievement Test
by June 2000.

•

Students will be able to read effectively. This will be
measured by 90% of all 2001 graduates scoring at
the proficiency level on the High School Proficiency
Test in 11th grade on the Informational Reading section.90

The import of such specificity relates to another shared
characteristic of all charter schools. Charter schools are all subject to performance reviews and failure to perform satisfactorily may result in revocation or non-renewal of the charter. Although specific standards for revocation and/or non-renewal
vary, all states condition the continuance of a charter on the attainment of particular performance indicators. Some statutes
91
specify grounds for non-renewal and revocation. Some simply
89. CENTRAL MICIIIGAN UNIVERSITY & CHARTER SCHOOLS: A COMMITMENT TO
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT, PHASE II APPLICATION TO CHARTER FOR 1999-2000, 3 (2000).
90. !d.

91. For example California specifies the following grounds for revocation:
(a) Gross financial mismanagement that jeopardizes the financial stability of the

35]

CHARTER SCHOOL LIABILITY

51

note that non-renewal or revocation may occur for failure to
92
fulfill the obligations of the contract. So whether the student
performance indicators are required in the application or the
contract itself, a charter school's existence is predicated on the
achievement of those articulated goals. Failure to provide an
educational environment in which students attain this goal
may result in revocation of the charter. Therefore, it could be
argued that each charter school contract is a compact that
binds the school to certain student outcomes in exchange for
the state educational funds provided through the contract. In
fact, the United States Department of Education lists "failure
to meet student achievement goals and expectations" as one of
93
the three most frequent rationales for charter revocation.
As mentioned earlier, charter schools must compete for students. Therefore, promotional literature takes on heightened
importance in such a market-driven, "contractual" context. The
claims made in an attempt to attract students could also form
the basis for claims of misrepresentation later on. In addition,
since brochures, web sites, etc. may form the basis by which
parents make decisions to send their children to a particular
charter school, those sources may further define the duty the

charter school.
(b) Illegal or substantially improper use of charter school funds for the personal
benefit of
any officer, director, or fiduciary of the charter school.
(c) Substantial and sustained departure from measurably successful practices such
that
continued departure would jeopardize the educational development of the school's
pupils.
CAL.EDUC.CODE §§ 47600- 47616.5 (West 1999).
Similarly, Wisconsin lists the following:
(a) The charter school violated its contract with the school board or the entity under sub. (2r) (b).
(b) The pupils enrolled in the charter school failed to make sufficient progress toward attaining the educational goals under§ 118.01.
(c) The charter school failed to comply with generally accepted accounting standards of fiscal management.
(d) The charter school violated this section.
WIS. STAT. § 118.40 (1999)/
92. For example, Arizona law allows non-renewal when the charter school "has
failed to complete the obligations of the contract or has failed to comply with this article." Revocation may occur at any time "if the charter school breaches one or more provisions of its charter." ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 15-181 - 15-189 (2000).
93. "[F)inancial mismanagement, [and] a violation of the charter agreement" are
the other two. See "The Charter School Roadmap, September 1998" U.S. Department of
Education.
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school has assumed for particular student outcomes.
For instance, the following mission statements were taken
from charter schools' web sites. Note how each makes affirmative statements about the abilities students will acquire at
their schools. The first example comes from Horizons Commu94
nity High School of Wyoming, Michigan and the second from
95
Renaissance Charter Jr./Sr. High School of Irving, Texas.
Horizons must provide up-to-date technology so that students
can:
•

expand their knowledge bases;

•

improve their critical thinking, problem solving, and
decision making skills;

•

access, analyze, evaluate and communicate information in expedient, efficient, and creative formats;

•

work ethically, independently, and collaboratively
with a diverse and changing population both within
the classroom and school, and beyond-across school,
state, national and international boundaries.

Renaissance Charter Jr./Sr. High School faculty and staff insure an environment of safety, respect, and accountability
while students prepare to improve the quality of life in world
communities. The school provides an equitable opportunity
for students to acquire a sound academic and career-focused
education. Students receive a strong foundation in humanities, science, mathematics, and career technology. Interdisciplinary curriculum is presented in a way that is relevant to
each student's world. Specialized support is provided for students preparing for careers that require post-secondary training. Students will prepare to be full participants in the 21st
century. Graduates enter the global labor force with marketable skills while embracing positive work ethics.

The following additional examples were taken from a web
page designed by the Pioneer Institute to show those aspirinP,
9
to start a charter school how to compose a mission statement. '

94. Horizons (visited Jan. 17, 2001) <http://www.horizons.k12.mi.us:80/>.
95. Cyberramp (visited Jan. 17, 2001)
<http://www.cyberramp.net/-tomlong/renaissancel>.
96. The institute describes itself as follows: "Pioneer Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, Boston-based public policy research institute." Pioneer Institute For Public
Policy Research (visited Jan. 17, 2001) <http://www.pioneerinstitute.org>.
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The mission of the Lowell Middelesex Academy is to enable
students to achieve academic, social and career success by
providing a supportive community that identifies, encourages,
and develops each student's interests and abilities .... Upon
graduating from the academy, each student will have:
•

A high school diploma;

•

A clearly demonstrated set of academic skills;

•

Experience in the workplace and in community service;

•

A clear awareness of their rights and responsibilities
as citizens;

•

A personal development plan for the years beyond
high school.

The Neighborhood House Charter School of Boston believe[s]
that the underpinnings of change rely on the creation of a
learning community, where everyone has something to learn
and something to teach .... The mission of the Neighborhood
House Charter School is to develop in each child the love of
learning, an ability to nurture family members, friends, and
self, the ability to engage in critical thinking and to demonstrate complete mastery of the academic building blocks necessary for a successful future.
The mission of YouthBuild Boston, Inc., a youth development
organization, is to "provide disenfranchised young people with
the academic, vocational, social and leadership skills they
need to leave life on the street, rebuild their lives, and take
responsibility for themselves, their families, and the revitalization of their community .... The YouthBuild Boston Academy offers young people who have dropped out of school a
hands-on, interactive, family-like learning environment in
which to reclaim their education and prepare for a lifetime of
continued learning and economic independence. The academy
is designed for students who failed school or for whom the
97
school system has failed."

97. Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research (visited Jan. 17, 2001)
<http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/csrdch2.html>. The Pioneer Institute also suggests
that charter schools "Make sure that your mission statement is published in all your
marketing and other literature, including handbooks, parent information forms,
newsletters, student handbooks, and press releases."
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In each of the five examples given, schools articulate various promises to those who elect to send their children to them.
Statements can be read to promise identification of problems,
services to address problems, and various levels of student outcomes including students' "complete mastery" of subject matter. Horizons Community High School even appears to promise
to maintain "up-to-date technology." Of course, each of these
promises begs the question, "what recourse do parents have if
the school falls short of its promise?"

Ill. EDUCATIONAL LIABILITY AND CHARTER SCHOOLS
As reviewed earlier, some authors have argued that any
traditional public school may now be held liable for failure to
98
adequately educate the children in their care. Yet, these theories may be insufficient to overcome judicial reluctance given
the long line of cases delineating concerns with claims of educational malpractice. However, those reservations may not be
as visceral when applied to the special circumstance of charter
schools. The particular characteristics of charter schools appear
to make them especially vulnerable to renewed efforts to hold
schools accountable through educational liability claims made
in judicial settings. Based upon these special characteristics,
claims using either a contract theory or statutory theory may
now be viable causes of action against a charter school.

A

Using Contract Theory to Found Educational Liability
Claims Against Charter Schools

Charter schools are more susceptible to breach of contract
claims than conventional public schools, because the charter
school-parent relationship is inherently contractual in nature.
Like universities and private schools, charter schools take a
market-based approach that emphasizes competition and
99
choice. Under such an approach, parents are consumers that
use information provided by the charter schools to choose
100
among various educational options. Additionally, the charter
between the school district and the sponsoring agency is contractual in nature. In exchange for freedom from various state
98. See supra note 1.
99. Wall, supra note 5.
100. !d.
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regulations, the school agrees to enter into greater accountabil101
ity as defined by the charter. Also, charter schools are required to describe their educational program in specific detail.102 This requirement leads to the development of specific
promises that can be identified in a breach of contract cause of
action.
Charter schools may be able to state a claim based on a
theory of an implied contract because of the application and selection process employed by charter schools. Parents apply to a
charter school in writing that either accepts or rejects the application by written notification. The offer of a seat and the
parents' resulting acceptance could be viewed as mutual assent
for the "bargained-for exchange" or consideration of the parents' commitment to enroll their child in the charter school,
thereby allowing the school to "claim" that child for the
per/pupil funding provided through the charter statute. This
process directly contrasts with traditional public schools where
attendance is dictated by place of residence and arguably no
such bargain exists. Of course, a court might conclude that a
charter school would not be vulnerable to educational liability
claims based on theory of an implied contract between the parent and the school because the written contract exists between
the sponsoring agent and the school.
Parents may be better able to make either a third-party
beneficiary claim, or promissory estoppel claim. An analysis of
an actual charter school provision illustrates these points. The
Bowling Charter School in Sacramento, California states that
it uses an efficacy model, that, inter alia, challenges students
103
in their "zone of development." The zone of development is
defined as the area a little beyond the student's current abili104
ties and knowledge. If a student is being educated beyond his
zone of development, then he becomes frustrated. If his educa10
tional program is below that zone, then he becomes bored. ;j
The school also identifies strategies that it may use to help
students get into and stay in their zones of development, in101. J. NATHAN, CHARTER SCHOOLS: CREATING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR
AMERICAN EDUCATION (1996).
102. !d.
103. U.S. Charter Schools (visited Jan. 17, 200])
<http://www.uscharterschools.org/res_dir/res_primary/res_bowling.htm>.
104. !d.
105. !d.
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eluding: (1) using the strong side over the weak side attribute
theory; (2) using feedback to find each student's personal learn106
ing zone; and (3) developing and using a support group.
If Bowling Green fails to conduct assessments to identify a
particular student's zone of development, but placed that child
in an inappropriate educational setting, then it is possible that
the child might be able to articulate a claim based on a third
party beneficiary claim. Like Ross and Squires, the charter
contains a specific promise - that the school will use assessments to determine the educational content and approach for
an individual student-that can serve as the foundation of a
breach of contract claim. Also, Bowling Green has contracted to
perform a duty, educating students, that is required by the
state's constitution and through its compulsory education statute. Additionally, the charter school has not contracted to perform a general duty, but a specific duty to educate those students who are attending the charter school. If a court refused
to find that a contract does exist between Bowling Green and
the sponsoring agency, thus negating a third party beneficiary
claim, the parent might be able to convince the court to apply
the theory of promissory estoppel. This is because it is evident
that the charter's promise to provide each student with an educational program within his zone of development would induce
a parent to have her child attend Bowling Green, and that the
school's promise was intended to induce that reliance.
Furthermore, a court might find that the public policy problems identified in the conventional public school context would
not exist in this hypothetical situation. First, an educational liability claim based on contract would not immerse the court
into the day-to-day operation of Bowling Green because, as is
the case in breach of contract claims against universities and
private schools, the court would merely have to determine
whether the school has carried out the specific promise of using
procedures designed to identify a student's zone of development.107
Second, the courts would not be subjecting Bowling Green
and other charter schools to undue financial hardship because
106. Id.
107. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 417 ("Ruling on [a breach of contract] would not require
an inquiry into the nuances of educational processes and theories, but rather an objective assessment of whether the institution made a good faith effort to perform on its
promise.").
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of the limited nature of damage awards provided by contract
law. Unlike tort claims, which permit monetary awards for
consequential and punitive damages, the remedy for breach of
implied contracts and third-party beneficiary claims is generally limited to the injured party's expectation interest, or the
amount that will place the person in as good a position as she
108
would have been if the contract had been performed. Additionally, the recovery under contract law is subject to three
limitations: (1) the injured party may not recover damages that
she could have avoided if she had taken appropriate action; (2)
the injured party may not recover for losses that the party in
breach could not have foreseen; and (3) the injured party may
not recover damages for loss be~ond the amount that she
1
proves with reasonable certainty. ° Contract law is also advantageous because if monetary damages are deemed unsuitable,
then contract law permits specific performance -i.e., the ren110
dering of the promised performance. If the court recognizes a
recovery under the theory of promissory estoppel, the parent
may recover her expectation interest (limited by foreseeability,
of course), or reliance interest (the cost of the promisee to the
detriment she incurred in reliance of that promise).m A court
would probably choose the expectation interest because of the
112
difficulty of computing the reliance interest. Thus, in the case
of the hypothetical situation, damages would be limited to the
cost necessary to raise the student's academic performance to
an acceptable level, as defined in the charter school's performance standards. The award could come in the form of monetary
damages to pay for remediation, or if specific performance is
the correct method of recovery, then the state or school district
could provide remediation for the student.
Third, the recognition of an educational liability claim under contract law would probably not result in a flood of litiga-

108. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, at§ 12.1.
109. ld., § 12.8.
110. ld., § 12.6.
111. Id., § 2.19.
112. !d. Upon first glance it might appear that measuring the reliance interest
would be easier than the expectation interest because the reliance interest would
merely consist of choosing the charter school over another school. However, the reliance
interest is made more complicated by the fact that the child also has to make an effort,
in reliance of the promise made by the school, to make her educational program work.
It would be difficult to compute this reliance interest. Consequently, a court may
choose to use the expectation interest because this is much easier than reliance.
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tion. One limitation is that the student's remedy would be limited to her expectation interest. Therefore, unlike tort law, the
incentive for obtaining large damage awards does not exist. In
addition, the number of breach of contract claims is limited by
the fact that courts would recognize a claim only where a charter school failed to fulfill specific promises - such as the placement of students, or the provision of educational services.
Fourth, although educational institutions have established
administrative agencies to resolve disputes, the function of
most of these agencies is to correct on-going educational con113
cerns, instead of redressing injury.
B.

Using Statutory Theory to Found Educational Liability
Claims Against Charter Schools

Similarly, statutory theory may provide a viable framework
for asserting an educational liability claim. As mentioned earlier, prior courts have been reluctant to find that statutory requirements created any actionable obligation on the part of the
states, both because of concerns for the definition of a "duty"
owed and because of public policy concerns about using educa114
tional funds for remedies in such complaints. Still, the applicability of those previous cases diminishes when applied to a
charter school context. Therefore, given the special features of
charter schools, a new possibility exists for the construction of
a statutory theory of educational liability.
Charter school contracts and the statutes upon which they
are based arguably shift the focus from that of describing "op115
timum educational results"
to identifying and quantifying
educational outcomes. Charter schools are the apex of an educational accountability movement that has been prevalent in
state legislatures. Charter statutes rank with increased
teacher certification requirements including teacher proficiency
tests, defined state standards, and student competency, proficiency, and graduation tests as measures enacted to hold
schools and teachers accountable for student learning.
116
In Cannon u. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court

113. McJessy, supra note 1.
114. Peter W. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (1976); D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North State Borough School District, 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981).
115. Peter W. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
116. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
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crafted a test to determine whether a federal statute made a
remedy available to someone seeking to establish such a claim.
Although any statutory theory of educational liability in the
charter school context will be dependent on state rather than
federal law, the factors established by Cannon are still instructive. They are:
1) whether the statute was enacted for the benefit of a special
class of which the plaintiff is a member,
2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create a private remedy,
3) whether implication of such a remedy is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, and
4) whether implying a federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject matter involves an area basically of con117
cern to the States.

For these purposes, the first three factors provide guidance
for considering whether charter school statutes and contracts
may be used to craft a cause of action for educational liability.
Charter school statutes are created to benefit the special
class of school-aged children by providing their parents some
measure of independent choice without foregoing a statefunded education. As noted in the above section describing
charter schools, charter schools exist to promote accountability
for student learning while at the same time working toward
educational reform. Therefore, the statutes are not only designed to benefit a particular group (school-aged children), they
also define that "benefit" available under the law as an education that has outcomes that are both measurable and accountable. For example, one stated purpose of California's Charter
Schools Act of 1992 is to "[h]old the schools established under
this part accountable for meeting measurable pupil outcomes,
and provide the schools with a method to change from rule118
based to performance-based accountability systems." Minnesota's statute likewise seeks to "establish new forms of ac119
countability for schools," while the New Jersey statute proposes to "establish a new form of accountability for schools

117. Id. at 678.
118. CAL. EDUC. CODE,§ 47601(D (West 1999).
119. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124D.10(a)(5) (West 1999).
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[and] require the measurement of learning outcomes." Accordingly, it can be concluded that charter school statutes are
designed to benefit school-aged children by providing them the
means to obtain an accountable public educational experience
of their parents' choosing.
In addition, the charter school contract and statute that
bind the school to stated performance objectives provide a
measure of reassurance to the parents that the educational
services purchased with the "voucher" will be quality services
and will allow their child to make adequate (or better) educational progress. Furthermore, parents know that charter
schools are subject to oversight and charter revocation if the
programs do not deliver the services promised. Therefore, the
parents rely on those reassurances to enter into the "educational experiment" that is a charter school. In so doing, they
place their trust not only in a specific school, but also in the
statutory scheme that created it. Consequently, charter school
statutes define an expected level of service. That level of service is further outlined by the particulars of the specific charter
school contract. In that way, parents trust in the system to deliver an explicitly specified level of service.
It is also important to note that parents, who elect to send
their child to a charter school, enter into that compact for an
individual child. Each voucher is calculated on a per/pupil basis
and the parent is free to "spend" that individual voucher at
whatever public charter or conventional school selected. Therefore, even though statutes generally refer to charter schools'
pupils in the collective, the entitlement purchased by the parents with a voucher is an individual one.
The second Cannon factor is the "legislative intent to create
a private remedy." Charter school statutes already contain
"remedies" of sorts. One collective remedy is revocation of charter school status. Another individual parent remedy is transfer
of their child from the charter school to the conventional public
school or another charter school. However, these remedies provide no relief from "injuries" incurred by having placed trust in
a school that did not deliver on educational promises. While
courts are still unlikely to recognize a private remedy that allows for punitive damages, a court may read charter statutes
and contracts as creating a limited private remedy to allow the
120. Charter School Program Act of 1995.
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parents to recover their "investment" in the educational experiment of the charter school. Or stated another way, courts
may read the clear legislative intent to create a "new kind of
accountability" as encompassing the private remedies of reimbursement of the voucher amount and compensatory education.
Reimbursement and compensatory education have long
been recognized as appropriate remedies in another educational context. Special education law includes a well-developed
series of cases constructing remedies for a district's failure to
adequately fulfill the statutory obligations of state and federal
121
requirements. Of course, there are significant differences between the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
122
(IDEA),
the state statutes enacted to comply with IDEA's
mandates and charter school legislation.
Most tellingly, IDEA establishes an individual entitlement
123
to a "free appropriate public education" for each eligible child
with a disability and specifies elaborate administrative procedures to enforce that right. In addition, IDEA specifically allows reviewing courts to "grant such relief as the court deter124
mines is appropriate."
Charter statutes generally do not
specify administrative or appellate procedures for parents dissatisfied by their child's charter school experience. Nonetheless, remedies under IDEA provide an interesting analogue for
considering potential remedies under charter school statutes.
Notice first that the duty owed to the children and their
parents on their behalf under both IDEA and charter statutes
both involve a specified level of service. In the case of special
education, IDEA specifies a level of service (a free appropriate
public education) that is further defined by the child's individualized educational program (IEP). For charter schools, the
charter statutes specify a level of service (measurable and accountable progress toward established standards) that is further defined by the charter school contract. Interestingly, "free
appropriate public education (FAPE)'' has no unitary meaning

121. See e.g., Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education, 471 U.S.
359 (1985); Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993) (compensatory education); Jefferson County Board of Education v. Green, 853 F.2d 853 (11th
Cir. 1988); Lester H. v Gilhool, 912 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating school district responsible for tuition reimbursement).
122. 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (2000).
123. 20 U.S.C. §1401(d)(1)(A) (2000).
124. 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (2000).
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but must rather be determined by examining the abilities and
125
needs of an individual child with a disability.
In contrast,
charter school statutes and contracts, as illustrated above, are
quite specific when defining adequate educational services and
progress. In that way, it could be argued that the duty owed
under charter statutes is better delineated than is FAPE under
IDEA.
The Supreme Court's consideration of reimbursement as a
remedy under IDEA provides further instruction. In School
126
the
Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education,
court was asked whether school districts could be ordered by a
court to reimburse parents for tuition at a private school if the
parents were able to show that the school district failed to
make available a free appropriate public education for their
child. In other words, could the parents be compensated for
placing their trust in a system that did not deliver on its promise of a free appropriate public education? The Court held that
such relief was ,rroper and refused to construe reimbursement
12
as "damages." Rather, the court concluded that tuition reimbursement "merely requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses that it should have borne in the first instance had it de128
veloped a proper IEP."
Applying this reasoning to the charter school context, the
parents' investment in the charter school in the form of the
voucher could be reimbursed if the parents could show that the
charter school failed to deliver on the promises made in the
charter school contract. Those promises might be broken by
failure to provide promised services, failure to identify and recognize learning problems, and/or failure to provide proper assistance once learning problems were recognized. Similarly,
parents could receive a remedial award in the amount of the
"voucher" they "wasted" on an educational environment that
did not deliver. Such a court-ordered remedy would "merely require the [charter school] to belatedly pay expenses that it
should have borne in the first instance had it developed a

125. The Supreme Court defined FAPE as "reasonably calculated to enable the
child to receive educational benefits" The Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 184, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982).
126. 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 23 Ed. Law Rptr. 1189 (1985).
127. 105 S.Ct. at 2003.
128. ld.
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129

proper [educational experience]."
An alternative to reimbursement under IDEA is compensatory education. Compensatory education may consist of additional months or years of educational services beyond the
statutory cut-off of 21 years or additional remedial services
during the summer or after-school hours. As the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained, "imposing liability for compensatory educational services on the defendants [school districts]
'merely requires [them] to belatedly pay expenses that [they]
130
should have paid all along."' As with reimbursement, compensatory education is only available when the parents canestablish that the school district failed to provide the expected
free appropriate public education.
Compensatory education may be an appropriate remedy in
the charter school context as well. As an alternative to reimbursing the voucher amount, the charter school could be ordered to provide (either the school itself, or through funds) tutoring or other compensatory services to help the student close
the gap between where the child is and where the child should
be had the services been adequate.
Both reimbursement and compensatory education mitigate
the traditional public policy arguments against a statutory theory of educational liability. They can both be calculated with
defined amount and do not involve exorbitant punitive damages awards. Reimbursement compensates for known expenses;
compensatory education compensates by providing prospective
relief in the form of extended services. Compensatory education
as a remedy might also be most applicable if the charter
school's charter has been revoked. In that case, there would be
no entity from which to collect damages. However, a court
might order the state to grant a child so injured by a poor
school the option of extending his/her formal education or funding compensatory educational services from another charter or
conventional public school of the child's choice.
The final Cannon factor examined here is whether a "remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative

129. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 359.
130. Meiner v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 750 (8th Cir. 1986). More recent cases ordering compensatory education include: State of Connecticut- Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State Dep't of Educ., 699 A.2d 1077 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997); M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central
Reg'! Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389 (3"' Cir. 1996); Punxsutawney Area Sch. Dist. v. Kanouff,
663 A2d 831 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
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scheme." Certainly, providing a limited private remedy for failure to adequately deliver on educational promises is consistent
with the espoused purposes of charter school legislation. As
noted above, charter schools were created in part to establish
schools that were more accountable to parents and the public
for the educational outcomes of students. Therefore, the use of
reimbursement and compensatory education as educational liability remedies would provide the kind of real accountability
charter school statutes address as their purpose. In addition,
these remedies make each charter school truly accountable, not
only to the chartering authority and the general public, but
also to individual parents.
Also, charter schools are by definition designed to spur innovation. Accordingly, when parents enroll their children in
charter schools, they are participating in an educational experiment. Providing an individual remedy to compensate parents for their willingness to participate in the state's experiment seems only appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION

As the above discussion illustrates, it may be possible to
craft a viable claim for damages resulting from a charter
school's failure to assist a student to obtain the educational
outcomes. Such a claim may be based on either a contractual or
a statutory theory of educational liability. If such claims are
realized, they will mark a new era where accountability is not
just a platitude, but an actionable expectation. They also may
open the door to other claims in more conventional public
school settings. For example, if charter schools can be compelled by courts to keep the promises they make, perhaps magnet schools that compete for students may also be so bound. Finally, if a traditional school's "competitors" are all subject to
scrutiny for failure to provide adequate educational services,
perhaps they too will come to be subject to the same judicial
examination.

